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? 1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to present two groups of results which have turned out to have a surprisingly close interconnection. The first two results (Theorems 1 and 2) were inspired by the following question: we know what sets are "decidable" -namely, the recursive sets (according to Church's Thesis). But what happens if we modify the notion of a decision procedure by (1) allowing the procedure to "change its mind" any finite number of times (in terms of Turing Machines: we visualize the machine as being given an integer (or an n-tuple of integers) as input. The machine then "prints out" a finite sequence of "yesses" and "nos". The last "yes" or "no" is always to be the correct answer.); and (2) we give up the requirement that it be possible to tell (effectively) if the computation has terminated? I.e., if the machine has most recently printed "yes", then we know that the integer put in as input must be in the set unless the machine is going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling whether the machine will change its mind or not.
The sets for which there exist decision procedures in this widened sense are decidable by "empirical" means -for, if we always "posit" that the most recently generated answer is correct, we will make a finite number of mistakes, but we will eventually get the correct answer. (Note, however, that even if we have gotten to the correct answer (the end of the finite sequence) we are never sure that we have the correct answer.)
Instead of requiring that the sequence of "yesses" and "nos" be finite and non-empty, we may require that it should always be infinite, but that it should consist entirely of "yesses" (or entirely of "nos") from a certain point on: the class of predicates obtained (which we call the class of "trial and error" predicates), is easily seen to be unchanged. It is obviously better if we know, not just that P is a trial and error predicate, but that (by using a suitable program) we can keep our machine from ever having to change its mind more than k times (for some fixed k, independent of the particular x1, X2, . . ., xn about which we are askingi.e., k is independent of the input). To make this precise, call a predicate P Since a k-trial predicate is obviously arithmetical, we are led to ask how non-constructive such a predicate can be, i.e., Question 2: What are necessary and sufficient conditions that there exist a k such that P is a k-trial predicate?
Our second group of results is connected with the meta-theory of quantification theory (without identity). A number of years ago, Mostowski3 reported on his unsuccessful attempts to find a consistent formula of quantification theory with no model in the "smallest field of sets containing the recursively enumerable sets". Since "set" here means set of n-tuples, what Mostowski wanted is, in our terminology, a formula with no model in which (1) the universe of discourse is the natural numbers; and (2) the predicate letters are all interpreted as r.e. (recursively enumerable) predicates, or truth functions (i.e. Boolean combinations) of r.e. predicates.
The main result of ? 3 is: a formula of this kind (the kind wanted by Mostowski) does not exist. Every consistent formula of quantification theory suffices to instruct the machine that it is to "print out" an answer only when it is different from the previous answer. does have a model in y1*. 4 (This result applies only to quantification theory without identity.) The proof uses Theorems 1 and 2, which are the answers to Questions 1 and 2, and the Hilbert-Bernays-Kleene result5 that every consistent formula of quantification theory has a model in Z2nrH2. In 1957 I gave an example of a consistent formula of quantification theory with no model in which all the predicates belong to E1uH11 (answering another question of Mostowski).6 ? 2. Characterization theorems. THEOREM 1. P is a trial and error predicate if and only i/ P e Z2n H2. PROOF. Suppose P is a trial and error predicate. (I shall give the proof for a one-place predicate. The case of an n-place predicate is exactly the same except that "x1, x2, . . ., x," has to be put for "x" throughout.)
Then by the definition (cf. ? 1), there is a g.r. function / such that for every x:
Now we observe that since / must approach either 0 or 1,
Thus P e 112, and by (1) we have P e Z2, since the predicate "lim/(x, y) = 1" is in 2J2.
To prove the other half of the theorem, assume
where R1 and R2 are recursive. Let L(x, a, c) mean that a is the smallest integer such that
An expression (Ex) (y) R, where R is a recursive predicate, is called a <2-expression here, and (x)(Ey)R is called a 112-expression. (Cf. [1] , ch. 9; Davis, however, uses "P" and "Q" where we use E and II.) We use K* to denote the closure of a class K of predicates under truth functions. In particular, El* is the smallest class of predicates containing the r.e. predicates and closed under truth-functions. 5 Cf. [2] , p. 394, Theorem 35. 8 Cf. [4] .
Define:
/ is general recursive, since from the definition of L we can determine whether or not there is an a such that L(x, a, y), once we are given x and y (there is at most one such a). Formally, it suffices to note that a must be less than y for L(x, a, y) to hold, and that the definition of L contains only bounded quantifiers. Let P(x) be true, and let a be the least a such that for every b Ri(x, a, b) holds. Since P(x) is true, there is for every a' at least one b such that R2(x, a', b); and since a is least, there is also for every a' < a at least one b such that Ri(x, a', b). There will thus be 2a numbers bo, b, ..., ba-1, ba-1 such that Ri(x, 0, bo), R2(x, 0, bb), .. ., R(x, a-1, ba-i), R2(x, a-1, b -1). Taking y sufficiently large so that each of these 2a numbers is less than y, a < y, we see that L(x, a', y) does not hold for a' < a. And if y is also bigger than the least b such that R2(x, a, b), then, checking the definition, we see that L(x, a, y) holds. Thus, if P(x) is true, for sufficiently large y we will have /(x, y) = 1; and in a similar way we can show that if P(x) is false, then for sufficiently large values of y we will have both L(x, a, y), where a is the smallest integer such that (b)R2(x, a, b), and /(x, y) = 0. This completes the proof of the theorem. THEOREM 2. There exists a k such that P is a k-trial predicate if and only if P belongs to El*, the smallest class containing the recursively enumerable predicates and closed under truth-functions. PROOF. Suppose P is a k-trial predicate. Then by the definition (cf. ? 1) there is a g.r. function / such that In proving the other half of the theorem, we will again confine attention to one-place predicates (or sets), since the n-place case introduces no additional ideas. Let P E l*. Then P = (Al-Bi) U (A2-B2) U ... U (An-Bn) for some n where the Ai and Bi are r.e. Following Kleene [2] , let T(e, x, y) mean that y is the number of a computation that the number x belongs to the r.e. set with g6del number e. We define f(x, y) as follows (where al, ..., an and bl, ...,b are g6del numbers of Al, ..., An and B1, ., );
/(x, y) = 1 if there are i < n, e < y such that (T(ai, x, e) & (e)<yT(bi, x, e))
/(x, y) =0 otherwise.
Then / has the properties (1) and (2) are also in El*. Hence it suffices to show that if A' is consistent then A' has a model in E1*; it will then automatically follow that if A is consistent then A has a model in Z*l. Finally, A' has a model in El* if and only if its existential quantification with respect to ai, ..., am has a model in El*. Hence the theorem reduces to the following Lemma:
LEMMA. Every consistent formula of quantification theory (without identity) with one predicate letter and no individual constants has a model in El*.
To prove this we start with a model in Z2nH2 (every consistent formula has such a model, by Theorem 35 of [2] , p. 394), and modify it so as to obtain a model in El*. Accordingly, let P be the sole predicate letter in A, and let A be true when P is interpreted as standing for the predicate F, where FIE Z2n H2. By Theorem 1, there is a general recursive function (i.e., b is a "modulus of convergence" of I, for xl, ..., xn <i).
We take R(O) as the set of all integers not belonging to any set R(i), i =# O.
It is easily proved that the sets R(i) are all disjoint and non-empty. It only remains to prove that Ge El*.
To prove that G E1*, observe that for any integer x, there are only two possibilities: x e R(O), and x e R(L(x)). Hence for any n integers xi, ..., xn, there are just 2n possible cases:
Moreover, the truth value of G(xi, ..., xn) (or G(X), as we shall henceforth write for short) on the assumption that any given case holds can be effectively determined: for instance, the truth value of G(.X) on the assumption that case 1) holds is that of F(O, 0, . . ., 0) (which we will assume given); while if, say, case 2n-1) holds, the truth value of G(X) is that of F(L(xi), . . ., L(xn-1), 0). In this case we simply find the largest of the numbers L(xi), . .., L(xn-l). Suppose it is L(x;). Then G(X) is true if (L(xi), . .., L(xn-1), 0, K(xj)) = 1, and false otherwise. And similarly with all the other cases.
We can now write down a series of zeros and ones which will terminate in 1 if G(X) is true and in 0 if G(X) is false, as follows:
Compute the truth value of G(X) according to the assumption that case 2n) holds, and hence x1 E R(L(xj)), where L(xj) is the largest of the numbers L(xi), and put down 1 as our "first trial answer" if the value is "truth" and 0 if the value is "falsity". The first trial answer is never revised unless an integer k is generated such that K(xj) < k, but for some zi, . . ., Zn <L(xj), it is not the case that /(zl, .. ., Zn, K(xj)) /(z1, ..., z. , k). If this ever -happens, then f(zi, . .. Z. , y) is not equal to f(zl, ..., zn, K(xj)) for all y>K(x;), zi, ... *, Zn<L(xj), and xJ eR(O).
If we ever discover that xj E R(O), then we pick the largest of the remaining numbers L(xi) and repeat the reasoning to arrive at our next trial answer. (If L(xj') is the largest of the remaining numbers L(xi), we can determine the truth value of G(X) on the assumption that x1 E R(L(xE )), because we now know that x1 E R(O), and so it suffices to know the truth value of F(zi, . . ., Zn) for zl, . . ., Zn <L(xj') to compute that of G(X).)
Proceeding in this way, we cannot change our trial answer more than n times (since, except for the trial answer corresponding to case 1), a trial answer is put down only when it is assumed that xi E R(L(xi)) for some i; and such an assumption is either retained forever -in which case it is correct -or abandoned at some time and never subsequently reinstated).
Let the above procedure for putting down trial answers be mechanized, and program the Turing machine so that at any stage y it repeats the last number it put down, if no new trial answer is forthcoming at that stage. Let g(xl, . . . X, y) = the number put down by the machine at the yth stage. Then g satisfies the conditions listed in Theorem 2, and it follows that G El*.
COROLLARY. Every n-place predicate in 2nH2 has an n-trial predicate as an inverse image under a suitable function mapping the integers onto the integers. (This is what was really proved after the Lemma. Theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of this fact by the discussion preceding the Lemma. By way of contrast, recall that there exist consistent formulas with one predicate letter with no model in ZlU l. Thus it is not true that every n-place predicate in 12nH12 has an inverse image in E1uH11, even if we allow arbitrary functions mapping the integers onto the integers.)
Hitherto we have considered models in which the domain (the range of the individual variables) was the set of all non-degative integers. For models of this kind, Theorem 3 is false for predicate calculus with identity, since there are even consistent formulas with no infinite model at all. If we generalize slightly, by allowing the domain to be any recursive set, then the question whether Theorem 3 extends also to predicate calculus with identity remains open. We are, however, able to prove: is now one-one (because R(i) is now a singleton, for all i), it follows that <S, G> is a model for A in predicate calculus with identity, where G is defined as in the preceding proof. Define G* as follows: G*(xl, . . ., xn) is true if and only if the truth value of G(xi, . . ., xn) is "truth" on the assumption that case 2n) holds (we showed above that this could be effectively determined). Then G* is a recursive predicate (we make free use of Church's Thesis; however it is straightforward to eliminate it by the techniques of [2] ), and G* agrees with G whenever case 2n) holds; hence, whenever all the arguments E S. Thus <S, G*> is also a model for A. It remains only to show that S is a HIl set (i.e., S has a recursively enumerable complement). To do this, we observe that S can be defined as follows: .z, . . ., zn,.b') for some z's bounded by i; for otherwise b' would already be a modulus of convergence for arguments bounded by i, and smaller than the least modulus of convergence, which is a contradiction.)
It is well known that Z2nI12 is the class of predicates of degree of unsolvability < O' (i.e., the class of predicates Turing reducible to K, where K is any complete r.e. set). Thus our Theorem 1 states that the trial and error predicates are exactly the ones of degree < O'. This fact makes it very easy to give informal proofs of the existence of predicates of degree < O' satisfying various conditions, just as Church's Thesis makes it easy to give informal proofs of the existence of recursive and r.e. predicates satisfying various conditions. ** The following theorem (unpublished) is due to Hartley Rogers, Jr.:
** Added August 24, 1964.
THEOREM. For any set A, let B(A) be the smallest class containing all sets many-one reducible to A, and closed under truth functions. Then B(A) contains exactly those sets which are reducible to A by bounded truth tables.
Thus our El* is the class of all sets reducible to K by bounded truth tables (where K is, again, any complete r.e. set). Hartley Rogers, Jr. has noted, after reading the present paper, that our proof of Theorem 3 can be modified to yield a construction which shows that for any A, if A is Turing reducible to K, then there exists an / and a C such that f(C) A, /(C) = A, and C is reducible to K by bounded truth tables. Thus our logical result can be obtained in a way which uses only the notions of Post's 1944 paper, without the introduction of trial and error predicates and k-trial predicates. It seems to us, however, that the "modulus of convergence" idea, used in the proof-of Theorem 3, is very easily understood when presented, as here, in terms of the ideas of trial and error and k-trial.
